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"Republica de Bandidos": The Prospect Bluff
Fort's Challenge to the Spanish Slave System
by John Paul Nuno
n the waning days of March 1815, Vicente Sebastian Pintado's
ship was anchored in tempestuous waters near the mouth of
the Apalachicola River at a place the Spanish called Loma de
Buenavista, known to the British as Prospect Bluff. As the surveyor
general of the Spanish West Florida colony, he headed a delegation to a recently constructed fortification built by the British and
their indigenous and Afro-Floridian allies. Pintado's correspondence with Captain Robert Spencer, the ranking British officer
present, echoed the unsettled nature of his mission. The Prospect
Bluff Fort, located in Spanish territory, was transitioning from a
strategic British outpost during the War of 1812 to a bastion of
black self-governance and resistance. Pintado's delegation hoped
to reclaim a significant number of runaway slaves from Spanish
Florida, particularly from Pensacola, living in the vicinity. 1 Beyond
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1
During the British Florida Period, 1763-1783, the territory was divided into two
separate provinces, East and West Florida. East Florida, with its government
in St. Augustine, encompassed much of the present-day state of Florida with
the Apalachicola River as its western border. West Florida stretched from the
Apalachicola River to the Mississippi River, with its capital at Pensacola. These
boundaries remained when Spain reacquired both Floridas in 1 783. When I
use the term Florida I am referring to both provinces as a whole unless I specifically distinguish between them as either East or West Florida.
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possibly constituting a majority of the fort's population, escaped
slaves from the Florida provinces occupied positions of leadership
3.nd demonstrated a steadfast resolve against returning to their
Spanish masters. 2 A previous envoy had already failed to secure the
slaves because the British refused to physically apprehend them.
Dreading a pending British evacuation from Prospect Bluff, Pintado warned that the fort would become an independent black
settlement free of white authority and destined to be a "republic of
bandits," which would destabilize the Gulf Coast. 3
Pintado's ominous words articulated Spanish fears over the
Prospect Bluff Fort and the challenge it represented to the racialized colonial hierarchy. Spanish officials sought to dismantle the
fort rather than contemplate an alternative course of action. This
plan deviated from customary Spanish practices in the region.
Unable to project substantial coercive power in the Florida Borderlands, Spanish colonialism exhibited an impressive elasticity, which
included incentivizing black participation within its institutions.
When black slaves used Spanish courts, owned property, or sought
manumission, they exercised their agency and improved their lives,

2

3

The Prospect Bluff Fort's population fluctuated as various groups of runaway slaves arrived in the area. Since runaway slaves sought to avoid detection, slave catchers had difficulty compiling-precise numbers. Furthermore,
estimates tended to ignore the considerable population that resided in the
hinterlands. Despite these uncertainties, runaway slaves from Spanish Florida
at various times made up a considerable portion (if not majority) of the fort's
population. According to Pintado, in April 1815, 128 out of an estimated 250
slaves at the fort were from Pensacola. Additionally, he stated that seventyeight blacks from East Florida also arrived at the base. While a number of
these slaves belonged to the Seminoles, some escaped from Spanish settlements. For Pintado's population figures see Vicente Sebastian Pintado to Jose
de Soto, April 29, 1815, Pintado Papers (hereafter cited as PP), reel 3, P.K.
Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida, Gainesville (hereafter
cited as PIN); Also see William S. Coker and Thomas D. Watson, Indian Traders
of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands: Panton, Leslie & Company and john Forbes
& Company, 1783-1847 (Pensacola: University of West Florida Press, 1986),
287. According to the authors, approximately 130 slaves, including twenty-five
belonging to the Forbes and Company, joined the British march from Pensacola to the Apalachicola River; Arsaene Lacarriaere Latour, Historical Memoir
of the War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814-15: With an Atlas, ed. Gene A.
Smith (1816; repr., Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999), 45. Latour
contends that Pensacola residents claimed losing nearly 400 slaves when the
British left for Apalachicola. In all likelihood this was either an inflated figure
or took into account the slaves from the region as a whole, rather than solely
from Pensacola.
Vicente Sebastian Pintado to Robert Spencer, March 31, 1815, PP, reel 3, PKY.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol94/iss2/5

2

Nuno: Republica de Bandidos: The Prospect Bluff Fort's Challenge to the

194

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

while simultaneously legitimizing the colonial structure. 4 However,
the Prospect Bluff Fort exposed the limits of liberal Spanish ideology toward slavery and race. As an autonomous Afro-Floridian
community, the fort presented an affront that even a racially fluid
Spanish hierarchy could not abide. The maroons who gathered
there, influenced by the currents of the revolutionary Atlantic and
bolstered by the presence of the British Army, encouraged other
slaves to resist their subordinate status rather than pursue their
interests through internal avenues . In light of the recent Haitian
Revolution and early Latin American independence movements,
vigilant Spanish officials advocated the re-enslavement of the Pensacola slaves by asserting a discourse of black criminality meant to
restore and protect the colonial order.
Despite Spanish efforts to re-subjugate the runaway slaves,
commentators and scholars during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries typically focused on U.S. efforts to destroy the fort,
which eventually succeeded in 1816. Initial accounts penned by
U.S. Southerners voiced trepidation over the fort's threat to the
regional plantation system. In the years preceding the U.S . Civil
War, the "Negro Fort," the name that Americans gave the outpost,
became a rallying image for abolitionists such as Joshua Giddings .5
His influential book, The Exiles of Florida ( 1858), presented a onedimensional view of the fort's runaway slaves as victims of Southern
slaveholders. Giddings made no men ti on of the Spanish slaves at
the Prospect Bluff Fort; in fact, he incorrectly argued that the runaways were "the faithful subjects of Spain." 6 Writing in the 1940s,
historian Herbert Aptheker refuted notions of slave docility by
accentuating examples of black resistance, including the events at
Prospect Bluff. He wrote that its dest:r:.uction was encouraged by
Southern newspapers advocating the elimination of an "evil" serving as an example of "insubordination." Broadly speaking about
4

5

6

Kimberly Hanger, Bounded Lives, Bounded Places: Free Black Society in Colonial
New Orleans, 1769-1803 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 26. The
author argues that self-purchase ( coartaci6n) benefited slaves, slave masters,
and the colonial system alike. Manumission functioned as a "form of social
control by holding out liberty to obedient bondpersons and denying it to
rebellious ones ."
American officials, such as John Adams and Andrew Jackson, came to identify
the base as the "Negro Fort," an illustration of how the fort's racial composition, from their perspective, was its most defining characteristic.
Joshua R. Giddings, The Exiles of Florida, or, The Crimes Committed by Our Government against the Maroons: VVho Fled from South Carolina and Other Slave States, Seeking Protection Under Spanish Law (Columbus, OH: Follett, Foster and Co, 1858),
37n.
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Spanish Florida, Aptheker stated that their slave sanctuary policy
continued after the American Revolution and was a source of "irritation" to the United States. 7 Focused on the fort's assault upon
U.S. racial ideology, these accounts solidified Spanish Florida's
reputation as a sanctuary, a beacon of freedom attracting runaway
slaves leaving chattel slavery.
While the history of the First Spanish Florida Period (15651763) comports with the slave sanctuary narrative, Spanish policies
after 1783 were often contradictory and based on expediency. Previously, colonial officials recruited runaway slaves from neighboring British planters to serve as a border militia. 8 However, Spanish
governors during the Second Spanish Florida Period (1783-1821)
had to adjust their policies. For instance, in 1790, East Florida Governor Juan Nepomuceno de Quesada oversaw the official end of
the slave sanctuary policy and began issuing land grants in an effort
to induce Euro-American settlement.9 Struggling to deal with volatile conditions and with limited resources available, Spanish governors hag little choice but to seek utilitarian solutions. However,
these policies had the potential to create new complications. For
instance, encouraging immigration could disrupt Spanish relations with its indigenous allies, especially if planter demands for
land ever encroached upon native territory. Moreover, growing
planter dependence on slave labor could have theoretically resulted in hardening racial attitudes and resistance against the use of
free black troops. Rather than a restoration of previous policies,
colonial administrators relied on a melange of older policies with
recent innevations. The complexity of the Second Spanish Florida
Period serves to contextualize Spain's anxiety and hostility towards
the Prospect Bluff Fort.

7
8

9

Herbert Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts (New York: International Publishers, 1974), 30-31.
Jane G. Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999) . Landers's seminal work, which highlights the free black
militia at Fort Mose, argues that free blacks and slaves utilized opportunities
and rights available through Spanish institutions. Her scholarship exposes the
contrast between Spanish and U .S. slave systems and racial ideologies, though
she does take note of policy shifts during the Second Spanish Florida Period
in other works. See Jane G. Landers, "Spanish Sanctuary: Fugit~ves in Florida,
1687-1790," Florida Historical Quarterly 62, no . 3 Qanuary 1984): 311-313.
For the land grant edict, see Joseph M. White, comp ., A New Collection of Laws,
Charters, and Local Ordinances of the Governments of Great Britain, France, and
Spain, Relating to the Concession of Land in Their Respective Colonies ... , 2 vols.
(Philadelphia: T. &J.W.Johnson, 1839), 245-246.
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Although scholars often posit Spanish Florida as a counterweight to the rigid racial hierarchy of the U.S. South, Spanish leaders nonetheless shared Andrew Jackson's and other U.S. officials'
trepidation over the Prospect Bluff Fort and the sinister forces
they believed it would unleash. The Spanish welcomed its eventual
destruction, lamenting only their inability to reduce the fort themselves. As opposed to other U.S. invasions of Spanish Florida, the
attack on the "Negro Fort" met with no formal protest; rather, colonial officials were preoccupied with the recovery of their slaves. 10
This article, after presenting a brief history of the Prospect Bluff
Fort's creation, analyzes Spanish efforts in East and West Florida
to re-enslave its runaway slaves. Unable to project military power,
officials such as Pintado pleaded with British military commanders
to assist in the apprehension of their property. Encountering what
they viewed as British duplicity, exasperated Spanish agents argued
that unsupervised blacks were prone to general lawlessness. This
discourse provides insight into what Jose Cuello calls the "racialized
core principle," Spanish racial-cultural superiority, as the basis of
colonial society. 11 While this precept could be flexible and inclusive
because it also factored in class, gender, and social comportment,
ultimately, nonwhites occupied subordinate positions. When slaves
sought to live independently of Spanish society, thereby rejecting
their inferior status, they directly challenged this principle.
As a borderlands region, Florida existed at the nexus of overlapping spheres of influence emanating from the Atlantic world,
Indian country, and the United States. Consequently, my analysis
of Spanish colonialism and slavery at the turn of the nineteenth
century considers how different racial ideologies were often in dialogue, and in some cases, in conflict. Speaking specifically about
the Prospect Bluff Fort, Claudio Saunt and Nathaniel Millett have
illustrated how the fort was involved in these processes. Saunt writes
that the Creek Red Sticks in their civil war against elite Creeks, who
10

11

Unlike the first scholars to write about the Prospect Bluff Fort, historians using
Spanish sources have noted Spain's antagonistic stance towards the outpost.
However, no scholarly work has solely examined the larger significance of this
Spanish hostility. See Frank L. Owsley Jr. and Gene A. Smith, Filibusters and
Expansionists: Jeffersonian Manifest Destiny, 1800-1821 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997) , 113;James W. Covington, "The Negro Fort," Gulf
Coast Historical Review 5, no. 2 (January 1990): 88.
Jose Cuello, "Racialized Hierarchies of Power in Colonial Mexican Society:
The Sistema de Castas as a Form of Social Control in Saltillo," in Choice, Persuasion, and Coercion: Social Control on Spain's North American Frontiers, ed. Jesus F.
de la Teja, et al. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005), 205.
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embraced Euro-American notions of slavery and property, helped
build the fort after their defeat in the Battle of Horseshoe Bend. 12
Millett, employing an "Atlantic Borderlands" framework, illustrates
how the fort's runaway slaves utilized British commanding officer
Edward Nicolls's radical anti-slavery ideology to assert a British
political identity and achieve the "fullest version of freedom." 13
Borderlands conditions in conjunction with larger geopolitical
maneuvering provided the forum in which ideas of slavery, race,
and identity were constantly being negotiated. 14 Within this fluid
environment, further exacerbated by the War of 1812 and British
offers of freedom, Florida's slaves rejected the Spanish slave system
despite its relative protections and malleability.
By 1814, Spanish officials, despite their pragmatic nature,
were struggling to deal with the volatile nature of the Florida Borderlands . In particular they sought to defuse expansionist threats
from American insurgents. Following the 1810 West Florida Rebellion, the United States, citing claims from the Louisiana Purchase,
annexed territorial districts in Baton Rouge and later Mobile.
Meanwhile in East Florida, former U.S. General George Mathews
covertly led Georgia militia units and a few East Floridian planters
in the Patriot War, which began in 1812. They captured the port of
Fernandina and lay siege to St. Augustine. 15 Support from the Seminoles and free black militias dissipated much of the rebellion's
momentum. U.S. support for the Patriot War ended once focus
shifted to hostilities with the British, thus providing East Florida
with a brief reprieve.
12

13
14

15

Claudio A. Saunt, A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733-1816 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1999) , 280. Saunt situates the fort as part of internal Creek disputes over
market capitalism, slavery, and political centralization. Engaged in a civil war
with acculturated Creeks and their U.S. allies, the more traditional Creek Red
Sticks retreated to the British and Seminole forces in Florida.
Nathaniel Millett, The Maroons of Prospect Bluff and Their Quest for Freedom in the Atlantic World (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2013), 9.
For recent studies that highlight the fluid and dynamic nature of the FloridaLouisiana Borderlands, including the contingent identities of its inhabitants,
see Gene Allen Smith and Sylvia L. Hilton, eds., N exus of Empire: Negotiating
Loyalty and Identity in the Revolutionary Borderlands, 1760s-1820s (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 2011), 4-6; David Narrett, Adventurism and Empire:
The Struggle for Mastery in the Louisiana-Florida Borderlands, 1762-1803 (Chapel
Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 2-3.
Detailed accounts of the Patriot War can be found in Rembert W. Patrick,
Florida Fiasco: Rampant Rebels on the Georgia-Florida Border, 1810-1815
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1954);James G. Cusick, The Other War
of 1812 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003).

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol94/iss2/5

6

Nuno: Republica de Bandidos: The Prospect Bluff Fort's Challenge to the

198

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

British commanders sought to exploit American vulnerabilities during the War of 1812 by opening a theater of operations in
the Southeast. The region offered advantages, such as a pool of
recruits among the Creek Red Sticks and runaway slaves. Ideally,
the British and their allies would occupy Mobile, New Orleans, and
the shipping lanes of the Gulf Coast. Although the British established an outpost at Prospect Bluff, they nonetheless wanted Pensacola, the capital of West Florida, as a base for their march to the
Mississippi River. Already indebted to British troops for victory in
the Peninsular War, Spain had little option but to tolerate another
intervention, especially in the aftermath of recent U .S. aggression.
Cautiously received as Pensacola's saviors, the British quickly
proved to be ungracious guests. Their recruitment of the city's
slave and free black populations undermined the social order precisely when colonial elites, after 1810, were confronting revolutionary movements throughout Spanish America. 16 Along the Gulf and
Caribbean coasts, black and native fighters used revolutionary and
counter-revolutionary campaigns in Mexico and Venezuela to strike
at social-racial hierarchies. 17 Typically, the Spanish sought to harness the power of black militias and indigenous allies to support and
defend their colonial structure. However, the British appropriated
this strategy and as a result destabilized Spanish Floridian society.
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Nicolls and Captain George Woodbine
of the Royal Marines primarily sought to recruit slaves from the
United States; however, they had no qualms about encouraging
slaves to leave their Spanish masters. 18 Due to a unique background
and disposition, Nicolls was driven by an anti-slavery intellectual
discourse to take extreme measures to undermine any slaveholding institutions he encountered. Furthermore, he endeavored to
infuse his black troops with a revolutionary spirit and a faith in
the virtues of British subjecthood and its ability to grant blacks the

16

17

18

Mateo Gonzalez Manrique to Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, August 29, 1814, Papeles
de Cuba (hereafter cited as PC), reel 116, PKY. The West Florida governor
justified his acceptance of British troops in the provincial capital as a response
to Andrew Jackson's aggressive actions .
Lester D. Langley, The Americas in the Age of Revolution 1750-1850 (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 175-190. Langley's work illustrates
how both revolutionaries and loyalists recruited slaves while simultaneously
fearing their militancy and desire for sociopolitical equality.
Coker and Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands,
289. British Admiral Alexander Cochrane later admitted to Pensacola slave
owners that Edward Nicolls overstepped his authority by taking their slaves.
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same rights as whites. 19 While Vice Admiral Alexander Cochrane
issued a concise proclamation offering freedom for military service, Nicolls's public statements went further by promising "rational liberty," property rights, and lands to "cultivate." 20 Seeking to
broadcast their offer of freedom to the greater U .S. Southeast, the
British found a receptive local audience in Pensacola, much to the
consternation of Spanish officials. 21
Within three months, British forces antagonized Pensacola
elites to the point that Andrew Jackson's subsequent occupation
of the city, comparatively speaking, would be viewed in a favorable light. 22 Despite apprehension from certain officials and trader
John Innerarity, a member of Forbes and Company (previously the
Panton, Leslie and Company trading firm), West Florida Governor Mateo Gonzalez Manrique opened the town's gates to Nicolls's
forces .23 Although the British were actively recruiting slaves elsewhere, Pensacola slaveholders must have felt a measure of confidence in their benevolent slave system. The city's slave population,
as was the case in other Spanish colonial possessions, encountered
opportunities as skilled laborers and property holders, and they

19
20

21
22

23

Millett, The Maroons of Prospect Bluff, 22. The author includes a substantial
analysis of Nicolls's background and intellectual development. This includes
his efforts to radicalize fellow soldiers and runaway slaves.
For Cochrane's proclamation, see Alexander Cochrane Proclamation, April
2, 1814, Joseph Byrne Lockey Collection (hereafter cited as LOC), PKY. For
Nicolls's Proclamation, see Edward Nicolls, "Orders for the First Battalion of
Royal Colonial Marines," 1814, LOC, PKY.
For British intentions to target the slaves of U.S. planters, see Alexander
Cochrane to Lord Bathurst, July 14, 1814, LOC, PKY.
Vero z. Amelung to Andrew Jackson, June 4, 1816, American State Papers ·
(hereafter cited as ASP), Foreign Relations (hereafter cited as FR), vol. 4,
Library of Congress (hereafter cited as LC), 557; John Innerarity, "Letters of
John Innerarity: The Seizure of Pensacola by Andrew Jackson, November 7,
1814," Florida Historical Quarterly 9, no. 3 Qanuary 1931): 131. According to
Innerarity, Jackson demonstrated his "generous sympathy" by allowing Pensacola to be resupplied with desperately needed foodstuffs; Latour, Historical
Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814-15, 45 . Latour's
memoir states that American troops were praised for their respect of private
property and "good order," meanwhile the British were vilified for absconding
with the slave population; Coker and Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands, 288; Frank Lawrence Owsley Jr., Struggle for the
Gulf Borderlands: The Creek War and the Battle of New Orleans, 1812-1815
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1981) , ll8.
Owsley Jr. , Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands, 114; Nathaniel Millett, "Britain 's
1814 Occupation of Pensacola and America's Response: An Episode of the
War of 1812 in the Southeastern Borderlands," Florida Historical Quarterly 84,
no . 2 (Fall 2005): 243.
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had access to some legal protections. 24 While slaves had to comport
with Spanish institutions, behavioral norms, and an inferior social
status, they could purchase their freedom and even become slave
owners in their own right. Considering the modest white population in Florida, the slave system's continuation was contingent
on black agency being channeled within the Spanish slave system,
thus reinforcing the entire structure. If slaves, particularly individuals well suited to take advantage of pathways to freedom, began to
desert their masters, then the entire system would lose its viability.
Although the Spanish believed that their slaves were simply
manipulated into absconding, it is unlikely they made the decision
lightly. In particular, the future leaders at Prospect Bluff, Gan; on,
Prince, and Cyrus, were skilled artisans in Pensacola and had the
ability to earn income, yet they joined the British. All three slaves
were thirty years of age or younger, carpenters, belonged to moderate to elite households, and in the case of Cyrus, literate. Pensacola's
lack of carpenters would have only further bolstered their opportunities for economic gain and manumission. 25 Few other slaves would
have been as well situated to take advantage of the rights available to
them due to Spanish law, religion, and custom. In East Florida, Lewis
Sanchez, a former slave, was a carpenter who parlayed his craft into
becoming a substantial landowner; his estate was later estimated at
over 2 ,500 dollars. A former runaway slave from Georgia, Prince Juan
Bautista Witten, was also a carpenter. He integrated into Spanish
colonial society and was granted land outside St. Augustine. 26 Thus,
precedent existed for skilled slaves to gain socioeconomic mobility.
However, working within the system offered no guarantees, nor was
it always desired. Robin, the slave of Prudence Plummer, was also a
carpenter and skilled craftsman, and often brought in between twenty and thirty dollars in rent per month for his mistress. In the middle
of the Patriot War, Robin left Plummer and escaped from Amelia
Island, eventually making his way to ·the Prospect BluffFort. 27 Robin
and the leaders at the fort made the calculated decision, despite the
24
25
26

27

Millett, The Maroons of Prospect Bluff, 49.
Lyle N. McAlister, "Pensacola during the Second Spanish Period," Florida Historical Quarterly 37, no . 3 / 4 Qanuary-April 1959): 309.
Jane G. Landers, "Free Black Plantations and Economy in East Florida, 17841821" in Colonial Plantations and Economy in Florida, ed. Jane G. Landers
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 123-128.
Frank Marotti, The Cana Sanctuary: History, Diplomacy, and Black Catholic Marriage in Antebellum St. Augustine, Florida (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama
Press, 2012) , 127. Marotti writes that Robin was reportedly killed in the destruction of the Prospect Bluff Fort but most likely survived and avoided detection.
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presence of prosperous former slaves living among them, to eschew
the benefits of subordinate mobility in favor of greater sociopolitical
autonomy over their lives. 28
Threatening the social order in Pensacola, slaves exploited
British overtures of freedom and became important agents in
enlisting their fellow bondpersons to their cause. Nicolls quickly
usurped Spanish authority and entrenched his forces within the
settlement's major fortifications, San Miguel and Barrancas. He
also rankled Spanish sensibilities by restricting civilian mobility
while posting his indigenous allies as sentries. 29 In conjunction with
the presence of his black recruits, Nicolls 's multi-ethnic fighting
force shattered Pensacola's social tranquility. Spanish slave masters' marginalization and aggressive British recruitment created
an atmosphere conducive to slave resistance. 30 Additionally, black
recruiters drove the steady stream of slaves heading towards British-held forts. Prince, mentioned above, was tasked and rewarded
with enlisting blacks whether they were "Freemen or Slaves. " 31 Captain Woodbine hired men such as Sergeant McGill and gave them
broad instructions "to take away all Negros, that could be got at." 32
In other cases, Woodbine directly paid slaves to leave their masters, as was the case with Charles, a slave belonging to Madame
Eslava. 33 Even free blacks were persuaded to become recruiters, as
evidenced by the efforts of an individual named Bennet. 34 Prince,
28

29

30
31
32
33
34

I use the term "subordinate mobility" to describe the potential material and
social benefits that accrued to nonwhites if they adhered to the legal and social
norms of the Spanish colonial system. Aflican, indigenous, and mestizo peoples could experience class and caste advancement by demonstrating their calidad, a combination of birthplace, wealth, occupation, acculturation, conduct,
legitimacy, and personal honor. This system nonetheless served as a form of ·
social control-since individuals who regulated their behavior were still denied
full equality. For a discussion of calidad see Cheryl English Martin, Governance
and Society in Colonial Mexico: Chihuahua in the Eighteenth Century (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1996), 128.
Statement from Pensacola Public Officials, October 11, 1814, in The Papers of
Panton, Leslie and Company, reel 19; Coker and Watson, Indian Traders of the
Southeastern Spanish Borderlands, 284; Millett, "Britain's 1814 Occupation
of Pensacola and America's Response," 245; Millett, The Maroons of Prospect
Bluff, 57.
Millett, The Maroons of Prospect Bluff, 58.
"Indictment of William Augustus Vesey for Perjury," 1816, Cruzat Papers (hereafter cited as CP), PKY
William Lawrence to John Forbes, February 1816, CP, PKY
"File of Witnesses that may be examined by Commissioners in Pensacola in the
Suit of Woodbine-Testimony of Peter Gilchrist," 1815, CP, PKY.
"Indictment of William Augustus Vesey for Perjury," 1816, CP, PKY; For a
well-researched examination of the Pensacola slaves that joined Nicolls and
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McGill, and Bennet's persuasive powers notwithstanding, the eventual departure of Pensacola's entire slave population suggests that
Woodbine's recruiters encountered motivated recruits .
Slave resistance thrived in the volatile conditions of Britishoccupied Pensacola, which caused slaveholders to fear financial
ruin . One of the largest financial stakeholders, the Forbes and Company, immediately began losing slaves when Nicolls first landed in
Apalachicola. 35 In Pensacola, the trading firm's losses continued to
mount. Even the Innerarity household was directly affected when
Phillis, their domestic slave, joined the exodus. 36 Exacerbating the
situation was the intense rivalry between Nicolls and Innerarity,
especially after the latter was accused of sending advanced warning
to Fort Bowyer and thus thwarting a British attack on Mobile in
September 1814. In the midst of their retreat, the defeated British
troops sacked the Forbes and Company store at Bon Secour and
freed ten of its slaves. Back in Pensacola, the company lost more
slaves to the British; Innerarity was forced to watch helplessly as his
runaway slaves resided nearby. Two months later, during the British
evacuation of the city, 130 Pensacola slaves left with the retreating
forces. Of that number, twenty-five (in addition to the ten lost at
Bon Secour) were company slaves. 37 The situation in East Florida
appeared equally grim for the company's partners; in this case,
John Forbes's plantation on the St. Johns River lost sixty-two slaves
to the British .38 In response, Forbes and Company embarked on an

35

36

37

38

v\Toodbine see Millett, "Britain's 1814 Occupation of Pensacola and America's
Response," 245-250; Millett, The Maroons of Prospect Bluff, 57-65 .
Coker and Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands,
281. Previously known as the Panton, Leslie and Company, the Forbes and
Company was a British trading firm given a special dispensation by the Spanish government to engage in trade with Indians in the Floridas. Since Spanish
administrators relied heavily upon the company, its partners held considerable
influence.
"File of Witnesses that may be examined by Commissioners in Pensacola in the
Suit of Woodbine-Testimony of John Innerarity," 1815, CP, PKY; Millett, The
Maroons of Prospect Bluff, 59. Phillis was one of the few slaves that did return
to Pensacola.
Coker and Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands,
287-288;]. Leitch Wright, Creeks and Seminoles: The Destruction and Regeneration of the Muscogulge People (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1986), 181. Wright argues that all 130 slaves that departed with the British
belonged to the Forbes and Company. However, Coker states that only twentyfive out of 130 slaves from Pensacola belonged to the company. V\Then the ten
from the Bon Secom· store are added to the total, the company's combined
loss is thirty-five slaves.
Coker and Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands,
293.
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exhaustive campaign to first, recover their slaves, and second, press
for damages through litigation.
Forbes was only one among many Southeastern slaveholders
who lamented the British presence in East Florida. Similar to the
situation in West Florida, Admiral Sir George Cockburn established, in January 1815, an Atlantic headquarters at Cumberland
Island, which attracted slaves throughout the region. 39 However,
Cockburn was located just outside Spanish territory, a few miles
north of Amelia Island and its port city of Fernandina. Nonetheless, the admiral, like his counterpart in Pensacola, accepted slaves
from Spanish subjects among his ranks. Out of 1,483 slaves who
made their way to Cumberland Island, East Floridians lost over
250 slaves; Forbes, in particular, lost around seventy-five slaves in
total. 40 Aggrieved slave masters soon blazed a well-worn path to the
island in order to confront Cockburn and recapture their slaves.
William Christopher sought his slaves James, Will, Rodriguez, and
Thomas, who escaped to Cockburn, despite the fact they were "not
mistreated nor given a motive for leaving." James Cashen stalked
his slave, Brutus, aboard the HMS Terrorand attempted to convince
him to return. Brutus confronted his former master and chose the
freedom that "the British offered him." All the testimonies stressed
the lack of mistreatment, at least in part because abuse of slaves
under Spanish law would have given the slaves the right to flee and
seek legal protection. Since this was not the case, the slaves were
operating outside the bounds of Spanish society. 41
In his attempts to seize his runaway slaves, Forbes encountered
the same frustration that awaited all other claimants. Traveling to
Cumberland Island after his slaves had escaped in February 1815,
Forbes charged Cockburn with illegally holding his property. 42 He
wanted the admiral to forcibly place the slaves in his custody since
he saw no justification for the British seizure of property from a
39
40

41

42

Tomas Llorente to Sebastian Kindelan, January 17, 1815, East Florida Papers
(hereafter cited as EFP), reel 62, PKY
Mary R. Bullard, Black Liberation on Cumberland Island in 1815 (DeLeon
Springs, FL: printed by the author, 1983), 105. Bullard examines the ship manifests of vessels leaving Cumberland Island and estimates that supernumerary
persons on board were runaway slaves. However, the author states that these
numbers may not include the men recruited into the British military.
Juan Jose de Estrada to Juan Rufz de Apodaca, December 22 , 1815, PC, re el
106, PKY; Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida, 183-201. Landers discusses cases when slave masters were taken to court for their harsh treatn1ent of
slaves.
John Forbes to George Cockburn, February 26, 1815, LOC, PKY
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subject of a neutral nation. 43 However, Cockburn ruled out the use
of violence and only allowed Forbes to address the slaves and seek
their voluntary return. 44 In a letter to East Florida Governor Sebastian Kindelan, Cockburn defended his actions by stating that his
conquest of Cumberland Island meant that the area was now British territory and "governed by the laws of Great Britain, (which
know not of slavery) ." 45 Forbes eventually followed his slaves to Bermuda only to come home empty-handed yet again.
In December 1815, East Florida Governor Juan Jose de Estrada
collected testimony from incensed slave owners, such as Forbes,
Cashen, Christopher, and Zephaniah Kingsley. Their names are a
testament to Spanish policies that shaped the province into the
early nineteenth century. For instance, Forbes's company owed its
trade monopoly to the Spanish outsourcing of the Southeastern
deerskin trade in order to maintain Creek and Seminole alliances.
Meanwhile, the other men had arrived in East Florida after 1790,
when the Spanish government established policies to attract EuroArnerican immigrants. Having abrogated its controversial slave
sanctuary policy, East Florida sought to attract colonists through a
headright system, a grant ofland to settlers, and a relaxation of religious requirements. Up until 1810, over 200 heads of family registered with the government and brought about 5,000 slaves into
the province. 46 These new immigrants, of whom sixty percent were
Americans, served to anglicize the countryside, which was already
home to a few remaining colonists from the British Florida Period,
such as Francis Philip Fatio. 4 7
Although many of the new arrivals operated small homesteads
with few slaves, planters such as Cashen, Kingsley, and Spicer
43
44

45

46
47

George Cockburn to Alexander Cochrane, February 28, 1815, LOC, PKY
Ibid. ; George Cockburn to John Forbes, February 26, 1815, LOC, PKY; William S. Coker, 'John Forbes and Company and the War of 1812 in the Spanish
Borde rlands," in Hispanic-American Essays In Honor of Max Leon Moorhead,
ed. William S. Coker (Pensacola, FL: Perdido Bay Press, 1979) , 78; Coker and
Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands, 293.
George Cockburn to Sebastian Kindelan, February 13, 1815, LOC, PKY Cockburn later argued that precedents existed for offering sanctuary to slaves from
belligerent nations. Although no precedents existed for dealing with slaves
from neutral nations, Cockburn felt the law could be extended to make his
actions at Cumberland Island legal.
Paul E. Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2002)' 253-254.
For a description and demographic breakdown of the Euro-American planters
in Northern Florida, see Susan R. Parker, "Men without God or King: Rural
Settlers of East Florida, 1784-1790," Florida Historical Quarterly 69, no . 2 (October 1990): 135-155.
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Christopher had substantial holdings. They were well positioned to
benefit from the 1806 U.S. trade embargo, which transformed Fernandina into a bustling port. Many plantations produced diverse
crops, such as citrus, rice, indigo, and, increasingly, cotton. By
1805, Fernandina was exporting 77,000 pounds of cotton, much to
the chagrin of Spanish authorities worried about the level of corn
production. 48 Nonetheless, men such as Fatio also depended on
cattle ranching and exporting timber. 49 Frank Marotti argues that
the East Florida economy at the turn of the century was much more
dynamic than previously thought. He notes that Francis R. Sanchez,
in 1812, before the outbreak of the destructive Patriot War, commented that the province had been "tranquil and prosperous." 50
This success was based on the immigration of merchant planters,
largely from the United States, and their use of slave labor. Consequently, rural East Florida estate evaluations prioritized bondpersons over physical structures, thus demonstrating that "slaves were
the real measure of wealth. " 51
Considering the varied background of its slaveholding class,
Floridians' racial discourse was far from uniform. For this reason,
the term "Florida Borderlands" is apt because ofits potential to fully
encompass the region's sociopolitical melange. East Florida during
the Second Spanish Florida Period was home to incredibly diverse
groups of people. Diversity did not solely signify Indian, black, and
white but also divisions within those- still novel- classifications.
The heterogeneous planter population included immigrating
heads of household from Switzerland, Scotland, Ireland, Spain,
France, and the United States. Among the Americans, a majority
of the households were from South Carolina, North Carolina, and
Virginia. 52 All of these peoples would have maintained ideologies
related to identity, slavery, and race, all the while exposed in vary48
49

50
51

52

Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 255.
Susan R. Parker, "Success through Diversification: Francis Philip Fatio's New
Switzerland Plantation," in Colonial Plantations and Economy in Florida, ed. Jane
G. Landers (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 75-76.
Marotti, The Cana Sanctuary, 11.
Parker, "Men without God or King," 148. The author argues that this represents a shift from the First Spanish Florida Period when physical buildings
received more detailed attention during appraisals. Historians have examined
how Spanish sociocultural ideologies shaped daily interactions in · St. Augustine. However, further study is needed on the influx of non-Spanish planters into East Florida, a majority from the U .S. South, and their impact on
the racial discourse and treatment of slaves along the St. Johns and St. Marys
Rivers.
Ibid., 140.
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ing degrees to their neighbors' worldviews. This environment, in
conjunction with economic, demographic, legal, and cultural factors, meant that slave experiences were situational and dependent
on many variables. 53
The influx of Euro-American planters into the northern riverbanks of East Florida created both a continuation and a rupture of
previous social conventions. In many ways, race relations remained
fluid, and Afro-Floridians retained access to manumission and
property. For instance, free blacks like Juan Bautista Witten, Felipe Edimboro, and Lewis Sanchez owned substantial holdings and
experienced economic mobility. Historian Jane G . Landers notes
that most free blacks received land grants, including applicants
under the 1790 headright system.54 These families established relationships and daily interactions with white families. A number of
white planters also fathered multiracial families with black wives,
most famously Kingsley's marriage with Anna Madgigine Jai Kingsley. She was manumitted in 1811 and was granted land; she also
managed the estate's slaves. 55 The Kingsley plantations used the
task system, as did many East Florida planters, which theoretically was more flexible and less oppressive than the gang system. 56
Zephaniah Kingsley later wrote a treatise about the need to promote benevolent slave ownership, which included manumission,
education, and black sociopolitical mobility in exchange for "good

53

54
55
56

Hanger, Bounded Lives, Bounded Places, 20. Hanger argues that cultural factors
alone do not account for high levels of manumission . Rather, demographics,
economic development, and the legal system contributed to the number of
freed slaves.
Landers, "Free Black Plantations and Economy in East Florida, 1784-1821,"
123.
Daniel L. Schafer, Anna Madgigine Jai Kingsley: African Princess, Florida Slave,
Plantation Slaveowner (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003), 33.
Ibid., 47. The task system allocated duties that slaves had to accomplish within
a given day. Once these tasks were completed, slaves were able to pursue their
own work. For works that comment on the task system in the Southeastern U.S.
and its potential to be oppressive, see Charles Spencer, Edisto Island, 1663 to
1860: Wild Eden to Cotton Aristocracy (Charleston, SC: History Press, 2008), 84.
Spencer, writing about South Carolina, states that the task system did not eliminate abuses such as "arbitrary work assignments, favoritism or hostility between
drivers and certain slaves, and some harsh punishment and cruelty by owners";
Karen B. Bell, "Rice, Resistance, and Forced Transatlantic Commu nities: (Re)
Envisioning the African Diaspora in Low Country Georgia, 1750-1800," The
Journal of African American History 95, no . 2 (April 2010): 169. Bell writes that
depending on the assignment and weather, the task system could be grueling
and debilitating. While the system enabled slaves to have less structured time,
"coercion and brute force remained the central elements of the labor system."
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behavior" and stability. 57 One of the benefits of this kind of "inclusive" society was the recruitment of free black militias for defense,
which was a hallmark of East Florida.
While planters like Kingsley acclimated to Spanish understandings of race relations, tensions with the Euro-American population
remained. In the midst of a 1 795 insurgency, the East Florida governor, doubtful of the loyalty of his Euro-American subjects, used his
black militia to relocate families to St. Augustine. Paul E. Hoffman
writes that the use of these soldiers was considered an "affront"
to Euro-American "race norms. "58 Sensitive to accusations that he
sought to invert racial hierarchies, Governor Kindelan, during
the Patriot War, judiciously used the black militia to great effect. 59
Although they performed admirably, the governor remained concerned with the behavior of his black population. He chastised
them for taunting Euro-Americans coming to seek pardons at the
end of the war. 60 Spanish officials recognized the delicate balance
between two vital components of their colonial strategy: free blacks
and white planters.
The judgeship of planter William Lawrence in the St. Johns
River Distinct is informative concerning the clash of ideas over race
and slavery. Appointed in 1806, Lawrence quickly brought East
Florida Governor Enrique White's attention to the long-standing
issue of slaves trading goods without tickets from their masters,
as was required in the Banda de Buen Gobierno, a proclamation of
the governor's initiatives and ordinances. He requested that the
57

58
59
60

Zephaniah Kingsley, A Treatise on the Patriarchal, or Cooperative System of Society, As It Exists in Some Governments, and Colonies in America, and in the United
States, Under the Name of Slavery, with Its Necessity and Advantages (n.p: 1828), 7;
For a recent treatment of Kingsley, see Daniel L. Schafer, Zephaniah Kingsl,ey Jr.
and the Atlantic World: Slave Trader, Plantation Owner, Emancipator (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 2013); For a critical interpretation of Kingsley's
benevolent attitude toward race and slavery, see Mark]. Fleszar, '"My Laborers
in Haiti Are Not Slaves': Proslavery Fictions and a Black Colonization Experiment on the Northern Coast, 1835-1846," The Journal of the Civil War Era 2,
no. 4 (December 2012): 478. The author examines Kingsley's Haitian plantations in the 1830s, which were established for his freed slaves who became
indentured servants. Fleszar finds that Kingsley's rhetoric of black uplift aside,
many ex-slaves were exploited for their former master's personal gain; Daniel
Fountain, "The Ironic Career of Zephaniah Kingsley," The Southern Historian 17
(1996): 39. Fountain writes that Kingsley's ideas on race were genuine; however, his motives were to safeguard "slavery by creating institutional incentives
and rewards ."
Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 250.
Marotti, The Cana Sanctuary, 78.
Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida, 227.
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governor republish the law prohibiting these illicit transactions in
order to "remedy an evil of such bad consequence," which endangered slave owners' property. Although Lawrence's strict interpretation of the regulations initially sought to restrict slaves' activities,
an 1807 letter appealed for constraining slave owners' oppressive
treatment of their bondpersons. He wrote Governor White and
asked for a clarification of how slaves could be punished since
"some of the planters in this district use their slaves with severity,"
which is "undoubtedly contrary to all laws human or divine." White
curtly responded that any planters who caused death, loss of limb,
disfiguration, or loss of copious amounts of blood should be arrested and the matter quickly brought to his attention. 61 Lawrence's
correspondence demonstrates that even in the St. Johns District,
considered to be more in line with Spanish customs, as opposed to
the St. Marys District, homogeneity on these issues proved elusive. 62
The Haitian Revolution and the infusion of Euro-American
planters bred a discourse focused on the regulation of black social
behavior. The year 1790, as discussed above, marked a significant
turning point. It was also the year Governor Juan Nepomuceno de
Quesada issued a Banda de Buen Gobierno in order to regulate social
relations. In particular, he was concerned whether runaway slaves,
who had recently arrived in the province, were employed and
properly behaved. 63 Having succeeded Quesada, Governor White
proved equally worried about the black population. In 1807 he
decreed a new Banda de Buen Gobierno; among his decisions, White
sought to restrict the rights of free blacks. Officially, "gente de color'
could not hold dances nor stay out beyond curfew. Afro-Floridians
61

62

63

William Lawrence to Enrique White, June 19,. 1806, EFP, reel 58, PKY; William Lawrence to Enrique White, October 4, 1806, EFP, reel 58, PKY; William
Lawrence to Enrique White, May 26, 1807, EFP, reel 58, PKY; Enrique White to
William Lawrence, June 4, 1807, EFP, reel 58, PKY For other cases of residents
complaining about slaves trading goods, see Bartolomeo Morales to Carlos
Howard, May 12, 1795, EFP, reel 51, PKY;Jose Mariano Hernandez toJuanJose
de Estrada, September 7, 1815, EFP, reel 115, PKY
Kevin S. Hooper, The Early History of Clay County: A Wilderness that Could be Tamed
(Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2006), 92. Hooper writes that the Patriot
War exposed a "schism" between planters from the St. Johns River and the St.
Marys River. He cites Francis Philip Fatio, Zephaniah Kingsley, and George
Fleming as being representative of planters on the St. Johns River who acclimated to the Spanish slave system.
Bando de Buen Gobierno, September 2, 1790, EFP, reel 118, PKY; Landers,
Black Society in Spanish Florida, 201;Jane G. Landers, "Social Control on Spain's
Contested Florida Frontier," in Choice, Persuasion, and Coercion: Social Control
on Spain's North American Frontiers, ed. Jesus F. de la Teja et al. (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 2005), 37; Landers, "Spanish Sanctuary," 312.
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without employment faced six months of labor on public works
while being shackled. 64 As Landers notes, these regulations were
rarely implemented, since law was shaped by local conditions. 65
Nonetheless, gubernatorial edicts highlight a discourse of criminality that Spanish authorities feared would materialize without
proper supervision, a concern the Spanish later voiced about the
Prospect Bluff Fort. Additionally, the preoccupation with black
behavior was not limited to St. Augustine, as was the case with Lieutenant Justo Lopez on the eve of the Patriot War. From Fernandina,
he wrote the governor requesting further authority to punish free
blacks and slaves for minor crimes, such measures, he felt, being
necessary to avoid disorder. 66
During the slave exodus oflate 1814, slave masters and Spanish
officials did not contemplate whether aspects of the Floridian slave
system or racial discourse motivated slaves to run away. Rather, the
British were viewed as the primary culprits. In Pensacola, Innerarity wrote that they were going cabin to cabin trying "to entice the
slaves of the Spanish citizens to join them." 67 The claimants seeking their slaves on Cumberland Island uniformly stated that their
slaves were well treated and only left because of British interference.68 Governor Sebastian .Kindelan argued that the British were
guilty of facilitating the slaves' -escape by allowing them to have the
choice of either leaving or returning to their masters. However,
Kindelan unwittingly exposed the slave system when he rhetorically
asked Cockburn, which servant, having left his position, would ever
choose to "return to his servitude." Although a brief statement,
it does reflect an acknowledgement that slaves did not desire to
inhabit a subordinate status. 69 As mentioned above, free blacks
and slaves owned property, yet their holdings were typically smaller
than those of their fellow Spanish subjects. While Afro-Floridians
had relationships with whites, these relationships were nonetheless

64
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Enrique White Edict, May 20, 1807, EFP, reel 118, PKY; Bando de Buen Gobiemo, September 26, 1807, EFP, reel 118, PKY
Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida, 201.
Justo Lopez to Juan Jose de Estrada, December 24, 1811 , EFP, reel 61, PKY;
Juan Jose de Estrada to Justo Lopez, January 15, 1812, EFP, reel 61, PKY
Owsley Jr., Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands, 115.
Juan Jose de Estrada to Jose Ruiz de Apodaca, December 22, 1815, PC, reel
106, PKY; Bullard, Black Liberation on Cumberland Island in 1815, 78. Bullard
argues that aggressive British recruitment strategies were largely responsible
for the slaves running away.
Sebastian Kindelan to George Cockburn, February 18, 1815, LOC, PKY
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"within the framework of white superiority." 70 These circumstances,
and not solely British coercion, provided slaves with the "push" factors to leave their masters.
In West Florida, when the British fled Pensacola most of the
city's slave population followed, thus opting out of the Spanish slave
system. Their owners immediately protested the loss of their property, and like slave masters in East Florida, sought to recover them .
Vice Admiral Cochrane wrote to West Florida Governor Manrique
to reiterate the official but disingenuous British position, which
was not to interfere with the slaves of an ally.71 He counseled the
governor, in what became a familiar refrain, to convince the slaves
to return voluntarily without the use of force.
After the successful British evacuation to Prospect Bluff, the
Spanish sent their first envoy, Lieutenantjose Urcullo . He learned
firsthand that the British would not physically coerce slaves to
return .72 They cautioned him that the black population was very
hostile and capable of violent resistance . According to one British
officer, the runaway slaves "would die before they would go back."
Interpreter and Forbes and Company employee William McPherson encountered this resolve when his slave Jerry rebuffed him
directly by refusing to return. 73 Urcullo, who initially believed that
"a greater part of the slaves . . . wanted to return voluntarily to
their masters," suffered the same fate when addressing the Pensacola contingent. Only twenty-five women and children, out of 130
slaves, volunteered to return. However, by the next morning, more
than half of the slaves who agreed to depart changed their minds,
bluntly telling the Spanish agent that in "Pensacola they would be
slaves and there they were free." 74 While the majority of the slaves
were steadfast in their decision to stay, there was indecisiveness on
the part of slave mothers, thus highlighting the real dangers that
they faced with their children. Although the British made promises
of assistance, slaves still had to choose between the familiar, the
70
71
72
73

74

Marotti, The Cana Sanctuary, 95.
Alexander Cochrane to Mateo Gonzalez Manrique, December 5, 1814, in The
Papers of Panton, Leslie and Company, reel 19.
Mateo Gonzalez Manrique to Jose Urcullo, December 17, 1814, Ibid., reel 20.
Millett, The Maroons of Prospect Bluff, 104-105. Captain Robert Henry, who was
the interim commander of British forces at Prospect Bluff, later testified that
the slaves were willing to d ie rather than return to their former masters.
Ibid., 106; Jose Urcullo Official Report in The Papers of Panton, Leslie and
Company, reel 20; Coker and Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish
Borderlands, 289. According to Coker and Watson, Urcullo's party returned to
Pensacola with only four of Forbes and Company's female slaves .
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Spanish slave system, and the uncertain, life as soldiers or wartime
refugees.
After Urcullo's failure, the Spanish turned to Pintado, a native
Isleiio from La Palma, Canary Islands, with a long, distinguished
record of service to the Crown while preserving the rule of law. 75
Pintado had lived near the border between Louisiana and West
Florida. Aboard the royal sloop Balandra, he patrolled Lake Ponchartrain and carried correspondence between Cuba and Louisiana. In 1798, Pintado was at the head of the Feliciana District's
mounted militia, and two years later he became alcalde and chief
magistrate. He served an anxious populace who weathered rumors
of a French invasion while suppressing a number of slave conspiracies, including the 1795 Pointe Coupee Conspiracy. Scholars argue
that the plot, which authorities discovered before its coordinated
commencement, was partly due to the incendiary influence of the
French and Haitian Revolutions, which spread some abolitionist
sentiment in the region. 76 Unnerved Louisiana officials sought
to regulate the influx of Saint-Dominguan refugees, particularly
their slaves. 77 Consequently, Pintado was ordered to monitor and
arrest any "foreign" blacks that he encountered. 78 During a period of increased apprehension (1802-1803), he was called upon to
increase militia patrols, confiscate arms, and disrupt illicit gatherings. 79 Named the surveyor general of West Florida, Pintado left
for Pensacola in 1805 a hardened defender of Spanish colonialism
experienced with both foreign intrigue and slave resistance.
Pintado sought to order and demarcate Spanish society by relegating the Prospect Bluff Fort slaves to their subordirn;t te status.
He spoke with Admiral Cochrane, who was anchored off the coast
75

76

77
78

79

For sources that discuss Pintado's early life and background see John R.
Hebert, "Vicente Sebastian Pintado, Surveyor General of Spanish West Florida,
1805-17. The Man and His Maps," ImagoMundi 39 (1987): 51; Andrew McMichael, Atlantic Loyalties: Americans in Spanish West Florida, 1785-1810 (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 2008), 23.
Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, Africans in Colonial Louisiana: The Development of AfroCreole Culture in the Eighteenth-Century (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1995), 348; John E. Baur, "International Repercussions of the Haitian
Revolution," The Americas 26, no . 4 (April 1970): 403.
Ashli White, Encountering Revolution: Haiti and the Making of the Early Republic
(Baltimore, MD : Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 183.
Carlos de Grand Pre to Vicente Sebastian Pintado, April 2, 1803, PP, reel 2,
PKY; Carlos de Grand Pre to Vicente Sebastian Pintado, September 17, 1803,
PP, reel 2, PKY
Carlos de Grand.Pre to Alcaldes de Nueva Feliciana, September 18,1802, PP,
reel 2, PKY; Vicente Sebastian Pintado to Carlos de Grand Pre, April 17, 1803,
PP, reel 2, PKY
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of Havana, and received assurances that the admiral would issue
orders for the recovery of the slaves. However, Cochrane imposed
an important caveat when he once again prohibited the use of
force. 80 With a small measure of confidence, Pintado made hisway
to the fort and was greeted by Captain Robert Spencer. Later, Colonel Nicolls was present and allowed Pintado to address the Pensacola slaves and to make a plea for their return. As he struggled
to achieve his mission's goals, Pintado made a couple of interesting
observations about the fort and what he felt it represented. His
background as both a civil and military official preconditioned a
negative appraisal of the fort and its inhabitants. In his letter to
Spencer, he stated that the removal of supervisory British officials
and troops would create a "republic of bandits," thus threatening
the entire region. 81
"Republic" was a loaded term in the revolutionary Atlantic; it
signified, among elites, the sociopolitical tumult associated with
efforts to establish more representative governments. Traditionally, the Spanish conceptualized a republic as an entity that stratified social classes in order to prevent challenges to the established
hierarchy. In regards to blacks and mixed-raced peoples, officials
believed their inclination towards "idleness, vagabondage, licentiousness, insolence, unruliness, and irreverence" represented
one of these challenges. 82 A well-functioning republic sought to
suppress socially disruptive behavior and ensure "harmony and
justice." 83 Interestingly, Pintado paired "republic" with "bandits," a
80

81
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John Innerarity to John Forbes, May 22, 1815, The Papers of Panton, Leslie
and Company, reel 20; Vicente Sebastian Pintaoo to Jose de Soto, April 29,
1815, PP, reel 3, PKY; Millett, The Maroons of Prospect Bluff, 108.
Vicente Sebastian Pintado to Robert Spencer, March 31, 1815, PP, reel 3, PKY
Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 1492-1700 (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 397.
Steven W. Hackel, Children of Coyote, Missionaries of Saint Francis: Indian-Spanish
Relations in Colonial California, 1769-1850 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2005), 231. In addition to describing Spanish understandings
of an ideal republic, the author examines the existence of the Republica de
Indios (Republic of Indians) . Situated as a separate but subordinate governing body, the Republic of Indians allowed indigenous groups in the Spanish
colonies a measure of autonomy, which preserved aspects of their previous
political system. Nonetheless, Spanish authorities oversaw native leaders and
sought to shape and control the system for their own benefit. Any similarities
between the Republic of Indians and Pintado's "republic of bandits" are minimal. Although both describe separate governing entities, the former retained
a subordinate relationship with the Spanish crown, while the latter was independent. This may explain why the Republic of Indians is based on an ethnic/
caste designation, while the term '.'republic of bandits" emphasizes the fort's
extralegal status; For an examination of the Republic of Indians during the
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word whose meaning is antithetical to social order. Banditry stood
for lawlessness and a lack of respect for property. The Pensacola
slaves were labeled as criminals because they shattered any sense of
harmony and justice by refusing to occupy their inferior position
within the republic. Thus, Pintado viewed their actions as either
an inversion of a republic in its traditional sense or an insurgency
fueled by recent revolutionary activity. Perhaps influenced by both
of these understandings, the surveyor general's assessment clearly
emphasized the fort's lawlessness and support for criminality.
Pintado's perception of the Prospect Bluff Fort was likely
shaped by his experiences in the 1804 Kemper Rebellion. Initially
a dispute over an eviction notice, the Kemper brothers, Reuben,
Nathan, and Samuel, plundered the Baton Rouge area. Seeking
to legitimatize their lawlessness, the aspiring filibusters declared
the birth of the "West Florida Republic." 84 Contemptuous of Spanish authority,- the men and their associates kidnapped Pintado,
burned his house, and damaged his cotton gin. 85 Consequently,
he viewed the men as "bandits" and thought little of their revolutionary agenda. Although economically damaged and physically
accosted, Pintado survived the crisis while the Kemper brothers
fled to the Bahamas. Transferred to Pensacola, the Spanish official
faced another quandary ten years later when he was tasked with
recovering the runaway slaves. Echoing his analysis of the Kemper
Rebellion, Pintado believed that slaves' willingness to cite British
proclamations and possess military-issued licenses as the basis of
their freedom was a pretense for subverting Spanish law and order,
especially since Pintado considered British actions illegal because
they "violated" the rights of Pensacola's property holders and disregarded Spanish neutrality.86
As a man familiar with violent uprisings, Pintado sensed that
an unsupervised Prospect Bluff Fort was ripe for producing similar upheaval and only its destruction was advisable. His letters to
the British used menacing, if imprecise, language to describe the
danger. He warned of disastrous consequences, the possibility of

84
85
86

First Spanish Florida Period see Amy Turner Bushnell, "Ruling 'the Republic
of Indians' in Seventeenth-Century Florida," in Powhatan's Mantle: Indians in
the Colonial Southeast, ed. Peter H. Wood et al. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1989); Amy Turner Bushnell, "Republic of Spaniards, Republic of Indians," in The New History of Florida, ed. Michael Gannon (Gainesville: University
of Florida Press, 1996).
McMichael, Atlantic Loyalties, 76.
Ibid., 91.
Vicente Sebastian Pintado to Robert Spencer, April 2, 1815, PP, reel 3, PKY.
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evil acts, and the presence of wicked individuals.s7 Not specifying
the exact nature of these villainous acts, Pintado assumed that
the reader, especially in the aftermath of the Haitian Revolution,
would infer that blacks left un-policed would be prone to indecent
behavior. As mentioned above, William Lawrence invoked similar
language when he warned that slaves in East Florida were buying
and selling property without permission. The ambiguous yet potent
language used to describe black independent behavior alluded to a
type of nightmare scenario that officials felt was obvious and needed no further elaboration. Indeed, Spanish authorities had already
shown themselves concerned with the behavior of Afro-Floridians,
as evidenced in Quesada and White's respective edicts.
A key phrase in Spanish colonial discourse was "tranquility,"
specifically in regards to social relations. As discussed above, the
ideal Spanish republic was one that maintained the status quo.
Indeed, colonial elites sought a stable social order that was, ideally,
"highly stratified by race, gender, wealth, and legal status, where
every member was cognizant of her or his proper place." Kimberly
Hanger argues that in reality, New Orleans, as was the case with
Florida, experienced much social fluidity as well as the daily crossing of metaphorical borders. Consequently, elites felt a sense of
insecurity and sought to regulate the social comportment of lowerclass groups. Free black women of New Orleans threatened elites'
desire for "total tranquility" when they wore fashionable clothing,
hurled insults, or impugned the reputation of their social betters.ss
In Pensacola, even greater social "disgraces" occurred during the
British occupation: native peoples patrolled the streets, slaves left
their masters, and in at least one case, a prisoner was released from
jail. However, in the minds of Pensacola officials, Dolores Manrique 's behavior represented the worst indignity; the governor's
eldest daughter was accused of intervening in public affairs and
not conforming to gender codes.s9 Within this context, the capture of the Pensacola slaves was part of a larger effort to return
87

88

89

Vicente Sebastian Pintado to Robert Spencer, March 31, 1815, PP, reel 3, PKY;
Vicente Sebastian Pintado to Jose de Soto, April 29, 1815, PP, reel 3, PKY
Although it could be argued that Pintado sought to alarm the British into
cooperation so he could apprehend the Pensacola slaves, the surveyor general
used similar language in his letter to the West-Florida governor Jose de Soto.
Kimberly S. Hanger, '"Desiring Total Tranquility' and Not Getting It: Conflict
Involving Free Black Women in Spanish New Orleans," The Americas 54, no . 4
(April 1998): 541-543.
Statement from Pensacola Public Officials, October 11, 1814, in The Papers oC
Panton, Leslie and Company, reel 19.
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subordinate groups to their proper place while curtailing further
challenges to the colonial hierarchy.
Scholars have long highlighted U.S. hostility towards the Prospect Bluff Fort because of its threat_ to Southern slaveholding interests. However, the Spanish viewed the fort through a similar lens
and drew identical conclusions. East Florida resident Juan Xavier
de Arrambide y Goicochea noted that slaves continued to abscond
and join with the "bandits." He confided to the Spanish governor
that it would be advantageous if the United States "put an end
to this rabble that the English put in our territory, since our misfortune does not permit us to do it ourselves. " 90 General Andrew
Jackson's letter to West Florida Governor Mauricio de Zuniga
employed similar language, labeling the fort's occupants as "banditti" and calling upon the Spanish to "put an end to an evil of so
serious a nature." Similar to Pintado,Jackson also utilized ambiguous but alarmist language, warning that the fort would "excite irritations which eventually may endanger the peace of the nation." 91
Zuniga assured the general that his own "mode of thinking exactly
corresponds with yours." The governor pledged to do all in his
power to cut "by the root an evil which is felt to the full extent
stated in your letter by the inhabitants of this province ... whose
prosperity and tranquility it is my duty to preserve and protect."
Although Zuniga declared that the "negroes" were "insurgents or
rebels," he_lamented that he could not act against the fort until he
heard from his superiors. 92 Jackson would not wait on Zuniga since
90

91

92

Juan Xavier de Arrambide y Goicochea to Jose Marfa Coppinger, March 2,
1816, EFP, reel 84, PKY; Claudio Saunt, "A New Order of Things: Creeks and
Seminoles in the Deep South Interior, 1733-1816" (PhD diss., Duke University,
1996), 586.
Andrew Jackson to Mauricio de Zuniga, April 23, 1816, ASP, FR, vol. 4, LC,
499; For an analysis of the destruction of the Prospect Bluff Fort from a U.S.
perspective see John Quincy Adams to George W. Erving, November 28, 1818,
ASP, FR, vol. 4, LC, 540. Adams, as opposed to other officials, is explicit about
the threat from Prospect Bluff. He states that the base could be used for committing "depredations, outrages, and murders, and as a receptacle for fugitive
slaves and malefactors, to the great annoyance both of the United States and
of Spanish Florida."
Mauricio de Zuniga to Andrew Jackson, May 26, 1818, ASP, Military Affairs, vol.
1, LC, 714-715. Although dated as 1818 in the American State Papers, the letter was written in 1816, for a copy of the document with the accurate date see
Andrew Jackson, The Papers of Andrew Jackson, ed. Harold D. Moser et al., vol.
4, 1816--1820 (Knoxville: University ofTennessee Press, 1994), 41-42; Mauricio
de Zuniga to Andrew Jackson, March 26, 1816, ASP, FR, vol. 4, LC, 499-500;
Mauricio de Zuniga to Juan Rufz de Apodaca, May 2, 1816, PC, reel 120, PKY.
The West Florida governor argues that Spain should attack and occupy the
Prospect Bluff Fort so it is kept out of the hands of U.S. forces. However, he
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his response provided the justification for a U.S. attack on the fort,
leading to its destruction on July 27, 1816. 9 3
Solidarity between American and Spanish officials over the
Prospect Bluff Fort was logical. Elites throughout the Atlantic
world had a vested interest in protecting property, ensuring the
flow of goods, and curtailing disruptive foreign influence, specifically, in this case, from the British. Both sides believed that the fort
would become a den of iniquity, attracting all manner of unsavory
characters. As men of little esteem, they would utilize the bluff's
strategic location to embark on depredations, on both land and
sea. These characterizations, as well as the fort's racial composition, which was mainly black but also included indigenous peoples
and some whites, meant that the population resembled what Peter
Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker recognize as the "motley crew," a
lower-class racial amalgam that was essential for turning the gears
of market capitalism. 94 These laboring classes, they argue, harbored
a revolutionary zeal and were a constant source of consternation.
In Pintado's letter to the West Florida governor, he cautioned
that the Prospect Bluff Fort had the potential to unite sailors
(pirates) and slaves, groups whose labor was vital to the economy
and yet whose resistance could be disruptive. Pintado warned that
the unsupervised fort would become a second Barataria, a reference to the privateer Jean Lafitte's fortress, south of New Orleans.
Lafitte's ships used this strategic position to stalk and plunder
Spanish shipping while smuggling slaves into Louisiana. Similar to
other French privateers during the period, he sought to legitimize
his activities through an association with one of the insurgent Latin
American governments. In particular, Baratarian vessels received
commissions (after 1811) from the revolutionary government of

93

94

acknowledges the lack of resources needed to proceed against the slaves. He
also seeks assistance from the Seminoles in order to recapture the runaway
slaves;Jose de Soto to Juan Rufz de Apodaca, November 25, 1815, PC, reel 119,
PKY; For Spanish accounts of the U .S. destruction of the Prospect Bluff Fort
see Mauricio de Zuniga to Jose Cienfuegos, August 22, 1816, PC, reel 128, PKY.
John Quincy Adams to George W. Erving, November 28, 1818, ASP, FR, vol.
4, LC, 540; Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the US.Mexican War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008) , 3. Although specifically addressing the First Seminole War, DeLay notes that Spanish inability to
control nonwhites justified U .S. intervention.
Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves,
Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston : Beacon
Press, 2000), 28.
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Cartagena. 95 Although these ships were primarily engaged in economic endeavors, their potential to spread news and revolutionary discourse made them socially and politically dangerous. The
earlier Pointe Coupee Conspiracy,_partly a result of slaves learning
about slave insurgencies and the French Revolution from seamen,
had already established a regional precedent. 96 From the perspective of a civil official like Pintado, both Barataria and Prospect Bluff
exhibited a political veneer, whether from an association with Cartagena or Great Britain; however, this could not mask their true
lawless nature.
In 1814, U.S. forces successfully captured Barataria; their raid
on the stronghold resulted in the seizure of both property and fugitives. Undoubtedly, Spanish officials desired a similar outcome for
the Prospect Bluff Fort. Due to a heightened sense of insecurity
surrounding recent slave revolts and nascent revolutionary movements, Spanish authorities could not fathom an alternative course
of action except the capture of the fort's occupants. Despite a pragmatic colonial structure, the runaway slaves were simply offered a
general amnesty and re-enslavement, 97 Previously, Spanish governments had come to terms with maroon settlements in other parts of
colonial Spanish Arnerica. 98 They granted freedom in exchange for
cooperation, usually the maroons' willingness to return any future
runaways. In East Florida, the Spanish had historically relied on
free black militias, most recently during the Patriot War. 99 Obviously, the Prospect Bluff Fort represented an altogether different
proposition because it operated outside the Spanish political realm.
Rather than preserving Spanish colonialism, the fort encouraged
slaves to no longer participate within the colonial system. In addition, Prospect Bluff was not geographically isolated but readily
accessible, very defensible, and potentially, very influential. 100 No
95

David Head, "Slave Smuggling by Foreign Privateers: The Illegal Slave Trade
and the Geopolitics of the Early Republic," Journal of the Early Republic 33, no. 3
(Fall 2013): 434; Hall, Africans in Colonial Louisiana, 346.
96 For the role of French merchants, sailors, and privateers in the dissemination
of information that led to the revolt, see Hall, Africans in Colonial Louisiana,
346.
97 Vicente Sebastian Pintado to Jose de Soto, April 29, 1815, PP, reel 3, PKY.
98 Millett, The Maroons of Prospect Bluff, 120.
99 For a work discussing the use of free black militias in East Florida, in particular
the First Spanish Florida Period, see Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida;
For a couple of texts that examine the use of free black military units during
the Patriot War, see Cusick, The Other War of 1812; Marotti, The Cana Sanctuary.
100 A description of the terrain surrounding Prospect Bluff and the fort's superb
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accommodation with the maroons was possible because they were
the ultimate threat to social and political tranquility.
Although Pintado's mission to Prospect Bluff produced significant military intelligence, his reclamation efforts were far less
impressive. In a scene reminiscent of Urcullo's visit, Pintado and
his companions, Dr. Eugenio Sierra and William McPherson,
addressed the runaways. McPherson and Sierra were persistent,
each man visiting the fort more than once in pursuit of their slaves.
Sierra, in particular, faced a daunting task since his slave Prince, as
mentioned earlier, was one of the leaders at the fort. 101 The agents
were once again stymied by the ban on force and could only rely on
"persuasion." With the Pensacola slaves isolated on the adjacent St.
Vincent Island and lined up to hear their diminished former masters speak, Pintado pressed his case. Receiving surprising assistance
from Spencer, and even Nicolls, they proceeded to warn the Pensacola slaves of the "horrible and miserable" conditions they faced
once the British evacuated. If the slaves volunteered to return they
would be pardoned and forgiven. However, if the slaves remained,
Spencer cautioned, the maroons would be at the mercy of native
groups who would capture and sell them back to vengeful masters.
Despite the harrowing scenarios laid out irr front of them, Pintado
reported that only twenty-eight out of 128 slaves were willing to
return. However, when the opportunity presented itself, a number of these individuals withdrew, and Pintado returned with only
twelve slaves. Before they left, a few of the volunteers who changed
their minds felt empowered enough to confront Pintado face to
face. Responding to an urge that only human beings who have
experienced bondage could truly appreciate, they emphatically
told their former captors that they "did not want to go," and once
more, they left the Spanish slave system behind. 102
British policies and strategic interests were crucial to the mass
exodus of slaves from households and plantations belonging to
Spanish subjects. Before he left Prospect Bluff, Pintado noted that
Nicolls's actions betrayed his earlier cooperative stance. The colonel began distributing discharge papers to the maroons releasing
defensive position can be found in Covington, "The Negro Fort," 81; An analysis of Prospect Bluff's geographic location relative to other maroon communities is in Millett, The Maroons ofProspect Bluff, 135 .
101 Millett, The Maroons of Prospect Bluff, 289; John Innerarity to John Forbes, May
22, 1815, The Papers of Panton, Leslie and Company, reel 20 .
102 Vicente Sebastian Pintado to Jose de Soto, April 29, 1815, PP, reel 3, PKY; Millett, The Maroons of Prospect Bluff, 108-116.
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them from their service to the British military. The documents
made no "mention of their color or state of slavery," and were in
essence freedom papers since "only free men were admitted to
the armed service. " 103 With these papers, the runaway slaves could
leave the region and gain entrance into British possessions, the
closest being in the Bahamas. Nicolls 's actions validated Spanish
arguments that the British were responsible for manipulating their
slaves and facilitating their escape. From the moment that the British occupied parts of West Florida, Spanish slaves were supplied
with extraordinary opportunities to leave their masters. Undoubtedly, the War of 1812, Nicolls's antislavery discourse, and the intellectual currents of the revolutionary Atlantic provided a significant
impetus that propelled Spanish slaves' quest for freedom.
British assistance notwithstanding, the Pensacola slaves'
decision on St. Vincent Island cannot be taken lightly. Although
Nicolls's warnings to the runaway slaves were half-hearted, he did
nonetheless alert them to real threats such as the possibility that
they would be "prey to the Americans," which they "seemed as
much to fear." 104 While Nicolls and his cohorts relocated a number of slaves and promised future support, many of the Prospect
Bluff maroons faced an uncertain future. In April 1815, Pintado
presented the runaway slaves with an option to return during an
especially vulnerable moment, the eve of the British evacuation.
The runaways weighed their options carefully, a choice between
armed resistance versus life in the Spanish slave system. The fort's
leadership, having experienced varying degrees of social and
economic mobility, would have been acutely aware that avenues
towards manumission existed. However, these slaves rejected the
life of subordinate mobility for a chance at greater freedom, and
some paid with their lives for that decision. Their determination
and resistance undermined the Spanish colonial system, which
relied on its subjects to legitimatize its authority by participating
in its social and political institutions. The use of free black militias,
the presence of black property owners, and the manumission of
103 Vicente Sebastian Pintado to Jose de Soto, April 29, 1815, PP, reel 3, PKY
104 John Innerarity to John Forbes, May 22, 1815, The Papers of Panton, Leslie
and Company, reel 20; Millett, The Maroons of Prospect Bluff, 109. An indignant
Innerarity accused Nicolls of feigning cooperation while actually seducing the
slaves with various promises: freedom, land, compensation to slave masters,
a well-supplied fort, and Nicolls's continued support. While the slaves were
receptive to these promises, Innerarity, as a slave master, logically overlooked
his slaves' own internal desire for freedom.
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slaves allowed the Spanish slave system to survive and to continue
to enslave others. The runaway slaves from East and West Florida
decided they would no longer sustain that system, especially when
they were being exposed to alternatives like British subjecthood or
independence.
Pintado worried that the Prospect Bluff Fort would "inquietar'
(disquiet) the Spanish Crown's possessions on the Gulf Coast. Harboring similar fears, the United States destroyed the fort in 1816,
and a year later it invaded East Florida during the First Seminole
War in order to further displace indigenous and black settlements.
Although a U.S. gunboat destroyed the fort, many of its defenders
and hinterland settlers had already evacuated. 105 They sought shelter by living among the Seminoles, escaping to the more southerly
maroon community of Angola, or finding passage to the Bahamas.
While the fort's survivors and their descendants lived on, so
too has the historical legacy of the Prospect Bluff Fort. With the
onset of the 20Qth year anniversary of its founding, the fort continues to be a disruptive force, in this case, by complicating narratives
about the Florida Borderlands. Histories of Spanish Florida have
served to problematize understandings of race and identity in the
colonial South, where chattel slavery was practiced. However, scholars' use of Florida as a foil and setting for black agency risks the
promulgation of an alternative overarching narrative that leaves
little space for an examination of complexity and nuance within
the Spanish slave system. In particular, the Second Spanish Florida
Period witnessed daily interactions between diverse groups of peoples who had different and evolving ideas about race and slavery. In
addition, Spanish racial discourse, at least through gubernatorial
edicts, was more rigid in the aftermath of the Haitian Revolution
and efforts to recruit Euro-American planters to East Florida. Most
scholars agree that Spanish Florida represented what Ira Berlin
105 Lieutenant Colonel Duncan L. Clinch led the attack on the fort by bringing
troops from the north and linking up with gunboats commanded by Jairus
Loomis. After a scouting party had been ambushed, Loomis directed the gunboats to fire a heated shot into the fort. The cannonball made a direct impact
on the fort's exposed powder magazine and caused a large explosion . Out of
320 occupants, 270 were killed and many of the survivors had grave injuries.
However, many of the runaway slaves had advance warning and evacuated into
the Florida interior. For sources on the destruction of the fort see Jairus Loomis to Daniel Patterson, August 13, 1816, ASP, FR, vol. 4, LC, 559; Coker and
Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands, 307; For a wor~
that discusses the evacuation of the fort and the fate of its survivors see Millett,
The Maroons of Prospect Bluff, 116, 231-236.
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calls "a society with slaves" rather than a "slave society." However,
Berlin argues that the distinction between both types of societies
was not always neatly delineated, especially when those societies
were in various states of transition. Even then, transitional phases
represented processes that were "more circular than linear." 106
Studying race in Southern history, according to Jennifer M.
Spear, means recognizing that "the colonial South was a complex,
multiethnic, multicultural place, and we must avoid the temptation to simplify matters by categorizing its inhabitants and then
reaching conclusions about beliefs and behaviors based on those
categorizations." 107 Spear directs her comments to studies of Southern chattel slavery, which fail to see the complexity that existed
even within that slave system. Conversely, her insights can also be
applied to studies on the opposite end of the spectrum, which privilege Spanish slavery's liberal characteristics over its socially coercive aspects. The Spanish encouraged Afro-Floridian agency when
it was channeled in service of Spanish colonialism. However, when
Afro-Floridians sought social and political autonomy through the
Prospect Bluff Fort, in the eyes of the Spanish they were simply a
"republic of bandits."

106 Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 10. The author
outlines the characteristics that created "slave societies": overdependence on
slave labor, narrow paths to manumission, cruel treatment of slaves, increased
importation of slaves from Africa, stringent slave codes, and an ideology justifying the expansion of slavery. Meanwhile, "societies with slaves" exhibited contrary attributes: mild treatment of slaves, fluid boundaries between slavery and
freedom, a diversified economy, and slaveholdings that only averaged a few
slaves. Although Florida exhibited traits of a "society with slaves" during the
Second Spanish Florida Period, the area witnessed an increase in the importation of slaves (through Amelia Island), harsh slave codes, economic growth
- reliant on slave labor, rising exports of Sea Island cotton, and a few planters
with large slaveholdings. In addition, a discourse of black criminality was used
to condemn slaves for undermining the Spanish slave system.
107 Jennifer M. Spear, "Race Matters in the Colonial South," journal of Southern
History 73, no. 3 (August 2007): 586.
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